This comment assesses Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou's critique of arguments that long, frequently amended constitutions tend to be bad constitutions. It also criticizes their analysis of the purposes of amendment, arguing that most amendments, in some way, aim to respond to imperfections or correct flaws in existing constitutions. Furthermore (drawing on the analysis of John Marshall), the comment sketches some general criteria for a good constitution: that it should be a "great outline," not a detailed legal code; that it should be difficult to amend; and that it should not be amended frequently. Finally (building on the analysis of Jack Balkin), it maintains that a good constitution would be capable of serving as "basic law," "higher law," and "our law."
Fair enough as a criticism of leximetrics scholarship in general. But I would caution them here concerning their critique of Tsebelis and Nardi. Just because Tsebelis and Nardi use numbers does not necessarily mean that they claim to be value-neutral. In fact, it seems that they are not, and do not aspire to be, value-neutral. They do not seem to be putting an "empirical cloak" over "purely ideological choices." 7 To the contrary, they seem to be making an avowedly normative argument that it is bad to restrict a government in a detailed way concerning economic arrangements and its ability to respond to economic challenges and crises. Furthermore, they seem to be making the overtly normative argument that it is bad when government, before addressing an immediate and pressing economic crisis, has to secure an amendment to the Constitution, especially through onerous procedures. 8 If this is what Tsebelis and Nardi are saying, then there may be something to their argument.
At this point, Contiades and Fotiadou ask, "Can a constitution be characterized as a bad one, harmful to the state and the economy on the basis of metrics and without a profound analysis of its content?" 9 They suggest that it cannot, and they are surely right in doing so. But again, it seems that Tsebelis and Nardi are making precisely an analysis of a constitution's content rather than just tallying the metrics: They are criticizing certain OECD constitutions for saddling their governments with burdensome, detailed provisions that make it difficult to respond to economic crises.
Pressing the point, Contiades and Fotiadou ask, "Does harm to the economy, even if proved, suffice or even matter to characterize a constitution as 'bad'?" 10 Since they put "bad" in skeptical quotation marks, they imply that a constitution's contributing to harm to the economy does not entail that it is a bad constitution. I would argue that contributing to harm to the economy-at least in a sustained or catastrophic way-certainly does matter to characterizing a constitution as bad. For example, if the people of the United States were to amend the U.S. "Nonetheless," Contiades and Fotiadou argue, "criteria for constitutional design can be developed." They explain: "In creating rules for constitution-writing, normative, conceptual and empirical approaches of the constitution have a role to play, each offering different conceptual lenses." So far so good. But then they say: "By contrast, the attempt to make generalizations with regard to the optimal content of a constitution is a dangerous path, leading to a slippery slope." Next, they write: "What is remarkable about the Tsebelis and Nardi approach is the attempt to put forth a substantive criterion to assess the quality of constitutions." 17 I just don't see the dangerous path, I don't get the slippery slope, and I don't see what is remarkable about putting forward a substantive criterion to assess the quality of constitutions. This would seem like a dangerous path or a slippery slope only to someone who is overly relativist, historicist, and functionalist. (I am doubly confused when our authors go from criticizing Tsebelis and Nardi for pretending to be value-neutral to criticizing them for putting forth a substantive criterion for assessing the quality of constitutions.) of a constitution "requires that only its great outlines should be marked," and that it not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code." 20 In other words, a constitution should be a "great outline," not a detailed legal code. He also added, famously: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." Well, what is a constitution? Again, it is a great outline, not a detailed legal code. He explained that a constitution is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."
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The Marshallian tradition entails several criteria for a good constitution. First, as a very great exertion, it ought not to be frequently repeated. This desideratum applies not only to the making of a constitution in the first place, but also to its amendment. Second, as a great outline, a constitution ought not to be interpreted to be, or amended to become, a detailed legal code.
Third, if a constitution is designed to endure for ages to come and to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, the constitution ought not to make it difficult for the government to respond to crises (including economic crises).
But I must acknowledge that there is a competing Jeffersonian tradition in U.S.
constitutional law. The Jeffersonian argument prescribes letting the people frame a new constitution from time to time, even if we think that the present constitution has not failed but, to the contrary, is successful or at least adequate. Doing so would be an exercise not only in responsible constitutional self-government but also in maintaining the people's capacities to make and reform constitutions. In recent years, scholars like Sanford Levinson, who has criticized Article V for making it so difficult to amend the U.S. Constitution, have represented this Jeffersonian tradition in U.S. constitutional law.
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In support of Article V, I would make two points. First, I would give two cheers for Article V in a defensive sense, for it has protected the Constitution and its citizens against the recent rash of "amendmentitis" (a term that Kathleen Sullivan has used). Second, there is much to be said for Article V in an affirmative sense. As Lawrence Sager has cogently argued, the obduracy of Article V to ready and easy amendment of the Constitution has encouraged and fostered broad interpretation of the Constitution's rights-protecting and power-conferring provisions. 24 It has underscored the character of the Constitution as a "great constitution if not to respond to an imperfection, or to attempt to make the constitution better in some way? To be sure, I can imagine a Jeffersonian saying, a people should amend the constitution every generation simply to make it their own constitution, without regard for whether the new constitution or amendments adopted are good or whether the old constitution or provisions repudiated were bad. Within the Jeffersonian tradition, we might argue that a selfgoverning people living under a constitution need to exercise their muscles for self-government from time to time: just to keep their capacities for constitutional self-government toned. Here the people might amend the constitution for a reason other than to correct a flaw: They might do so in order to make it, in Balkin's formulation, "our law."
In a similar vein, Sotirios Barber, in his recent book, Constitutional Failure, argues that the most important constitutional virtue of a self-governing people is the capacity to reform a constitution. 31 But Barber contemplates that this important capacity to reform a constitution should be exercised precisely in making constitutional reforms to avert constitutional failure and, short of that, to correct flaws or at least to improve the constitution.
What purposes besides correcting shortcomings or responding to imperfection might amending a constitution serve? Our authors acknowledge: "[I]t is true that formal amendment is used to correct problems in the constitutional text, when these are held responsible for malfunctions." "Nonetheless," they contend, "this is merely one of the functions served by responding to imperfections or as correcting shortcomings.
! "Formal amendments allow constitutions to evolve along with an evolving reality."
As I see it, these amendments respond to the imperfection that the constitution did not correspond to that evolving reality. risks of confusing correlation with causation-in particular, of committing the "after this, therefore on account of this" fallacy when it comes to analyzing the length of constitutions and the difficulty and frequency of amendment. They are certainly right to argue, for example, that it is preposterous to claim that a long constitution, as such, or a frequently amended constitution, as such, would cause poverty. They are certainly right to observe in general that the relation, if there is one, is instead correlation; for example, the same factors that contribute to poverty might contribute to having a long constitution and a frequently amended constitution.
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Contiades and Fotiadou charge Tsebelis and Nardi with committing this fallacy in claiming that "longer constitutions cause poverty." 34 Whatever may be the case with Tsebelis and Nardi's particular argument, I want to generalize the analysis and suggest that there may be something to the line of argument that detailed constitutional provisions regarding the economyworse yet, detailed constitutional provisions that are difficult to amend-make it more difficult for a government to respond to economic problems and crises. First of all, these detailed provisions themselves restrict government's freedom of action in responding to the problem or crisis. That sounds like causation to me: in the sense that the restrictions might exacerbate economic harm.
Second, stringent amendment rules make it difficult to amend the detailed provisions that restrict government's freedom of action, thus making it even more difficult for government to respond to the problem or crisis. Again, that sounds like causation to me: that the stringency might contribute to economic harm.
Here, I may expose my parochialism as a U.S. constitutional law scholar. In U.S. To move beyond Tsebelis and Nardi's particular analysis and invocations of the ghost of Lochner, let me generalize and hypothesize a modest claim about causation, not merely correlation. Let us imagine circumstances in which a country has a very long constitution-one that partakes of the "prolixity of a legal code," rather than the brevity of a great outline, to recall Marshall's formulation. And let us imagine further that the country's constitution is very difficult 35 See Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy, pp. 7-8, 27-28, 41-43, 55 (n 14) (analyzing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) to amend. Finally, let us imagine that the country faces an economic crisis that the political officials feel obligated to address through immediate action. It seems that, in such circumstances, a long constitution, with detailed provisions concerning the economy, including detailed limitations upon governmental action, would be a bad constitution. In these circumstances, it would be better to have a brief constitution-a "great outline"-that could more readily be "adapted to the various crises of human affairs," to recall Marshall again. And I daresay that in these circumstances onerous procedures for amendment might make it a worse constitution. It would not be the length as such that would make it bad-as if editing out some words at random would make it better. Nor would it be the onerous requirements for amendment standing alone that would make it bad. It would be the combination of detailed provisions and onerous requirements constraining governmental action that would make it bad.
VI. Conclusion
Deeper still, it would reflect poorly on the country that it had designed such a constitution in the first place: that it purported to resolve so many economic matters in advance, as a matter of basic law. And that it made it so hard to address economic problems or crises. A practice of frequently amending such a detailed, obdurate constitution might make for an even worse constitution-incapable of serving as basic law, higher law, and our law. On these criteria, a good constitution should be brief rather than prolix, and it should be infrequently amended.
